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trade in transition while the continuation is linked to FDI. Gradually, CEE co-
untries became fully dependent on the “old” Europe. Lisbon strategies contri-
buted to the collapse of the manufacturing sector; while CEE countries could 
easily compete with the “old” Europe they could not compete with ruthless so-
cieties outside Europe. 
Socially, CEE countries can be put into two groups; some have retained re-
asonable social cohesion; three Baltic countries are the extreme on the other 
side. Indeed, while social protection expenditures in old EU members exceed 30 
percent of GDP, expenditure is less than 20 percent in seven out of ten CEE co-
untries. Before transition, the EU was admired in former socialist countries for 
its political democracy and the social market model. When they joined, many 
features of the attractive European social market model were no longer there 
and the EU showed little interest to promote the model in transition countries. 
The emptiness was filled up with neoliberal ideas, which is shown by economic 
liberty indicators.
The global financial crisis, particularly the credit reduction, significantlyhit 
CEE countries with large external financing needs. Foreign banks began to 
withdraw their capital by shrinking balance sheets in the subsidiaries. At the 
same time, FDI dropped to one fourth of the pre-crisis level. CEE countries thus 
faced net outflow rather than urgently needed inflow of capital.
BACK TO CAPITALISM AND TO EUROPE
Transition from a socialist to a market economy, a counterpart to sweeping 
political and ideological changes was a slogan of the last decade of the 20th 
century. It was to be based on four pillars: privatization, macroeconomic 
stabilization, microeconomic restructuring, and creation of a legal framework for 
a new economic system. All former socialist countries declared uncompromising 
faith in capitalist market mechanisms; the firmer, the fewer market institutions 
they possessed. Privatization was considered the cornerstone of transition. And 
again, every single government in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) declared its 
firm commitment to full scale privatization2 as it was assumed that privatization 
will improve efficiency in the use of the assets, enable fairness in distribution of 
wealth and welfare, and help the abolition of the mono-party system. 
2  The notion privatization is not uniquely defined. Dictionary of Economics (Bannock,  Baxter & Rees,1986), for 
example, defines privatization as “the sale of government-owned equity in nationalized industries or other 
commercial firms to private investors, with or without the loss of government control in these organizations”. 
After transition in CEE started, the definition widened to any form of transfer of wealth from the state sector to the 
private sector. Sadowski (1991: 47) distinguishes between two understandings of privatization, a full elimination 
of state property by transferring it into private hands, and changing the ownership structure by expanding the 
share of the private sector against that of the public sector, as to make the former eventually dominant.
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The first assumption is taken for granted; private property rights namely provide 
incentives to save, to invest, to look for new products, to innovate production, to 
use existing resources in an optimal manner, and to bear risks of the decisions. 
However, privatization appears a necessary but not a sufficient condition for creating 
an institutional environment that assures economic efficiency. There were at least 
three issues or gaps that needed to be considered; technological,  institutional, 
and behavioral. The technological gap could be overcome relatively easily. To 
overcome the other two gaps rapidly has been much more difficult. Formally, 
market institutions can be established by a decree; it is but unlikely that they would 
immediately function in the way they function in developed market economies. 
The performances of market institutions namely crucially depend on norms and 
patterns of social behavior; »successful operation and management of a market-
type economy is, to a surprisingly large extent, a confidence trick« (Hare, 1991: 3). 
Agents taking part in economic transactions, adapted to changing circumstances, 
must believe that everyone else behaves up to the principles of the society; rather 
little can be governed by formal rules and contracts. The validity of the second 
assumption is dubious. Fairness in the distribution of wealth and welfare is an 
extremely ambiguous concept as illustrated, for example, by enormous variations 
of social protection such as pensions and health care, even among most developed 
capitalist welfare countries. With increased efficiency being remote and fairness 
ambiguous, the aim of privatization in the CEE countries was often reduced 
to a transparent political goal - to help abolish a mono-party system. While the 
dominance of private property rights seems the proper basis for a stable political 
democracy, the new political elites used privatization also as a tool to increase their 
political legitimacy. The speed of the operation therefore, understandably, became 
the criteria to evaluate the procedures of ownership “restructuring” and can also be 
only partly attributed to the faith of the new political elite in the supremacy of the 
market system. The responsibility aspect of ownership has been neglected both in 
theory and, even more so, in technical solutions3. The diversity of technical solutions 
namely reflected concurrent distribution of political power in a particular country, 
and randomly chosen western »privatizers« rather than genuine differences among 
3  Bajt (1992) distinguished between two notions of privatization. They are based on his distinction between the 
legal and the economic concept of ownership, with the later being related to distribution of income. While, accor-
ding to the legal concept, “privatization amounts to restitution of private ownership rights in tangible capital in 
the form both of denationalization of the previously nationalized private capital (re-privatization) and privati-
zation of the state accumulated capital” (Bajt, 1992: 8), privatization in the economic sense connotes the arran-
gements by which people earn their incomes. His distinction should have important consequences for practical 
solutions particularly in the countries of the former Yugoslavia as it related privatization not so much with the 
legal sense of ownership, but more with responsibilities for proper use and maintenance of assets. The warnings 
such as “to avoid the adverse effects of privatization in the process of transition, the existing property rights, par-
ticularly those of managers, ought to be strengthened rather than weakened and destroyed as is unavoidably 
done by the mass privatization” (Bajt, 1992: 19) appeared contrary to routines in the conventional theories of 
transition and were overlooked. 
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countries: social environment, the existing institutional framework, the degree of 
monetization of the economy, industrial structure, incorporation into the world 
market, and macroeconomic performances4. 
»Back to Europe« was another slogan of the last decade of the 20th century 
and the second ultimate goal of all former socialist countries in CEE; the full EU 
membership was considered a panacea for all current and future economic and 
socio-political problems. Accession enthusiasm was founded both on socio-
political and economic considerations. Political democracy and the social market 
model with high standards of living were understandably attractive, and the EU 
was practically the only market left to CEE countries after the break of SEV. They 
could not afford to get away from it; they also expected capital in the form of 
direct investments, well paid jobs, and fiscal transfers. CEE countries therefore 
swiftly adapted their economic policies to reach the goal. The benefits were 
very much stressed by many studies calculating the contribution of accession 
to growth through adaptation to a better economic system, increased FDI, and 
subsidies. Opposite views were rare. A few liberal economists argued that CEE 
countries »would be better off by staying outside the EU and continuing improving 
economic freedom and the rule of law« (Prokopijević, 2005, 6). While enthusiasm 
for accession on the part of CEE countries was founded both on socio-political and 
economic grounds, enthusiasm for enlargement of the incumbents was based 
predominantly on political grounds5. 
New member states (NMS) or CEE countries are often treated as a homogeneous 
group though the differences among them are substantial. They descend from 
initial conditions, the choice of transition model, and economic policies shaped by 
political developments. Despite that, common features linked to transition and to 
the EU accession prevail. 
A »GOLDEN ERA« OF  JOBLESS AND UNSUSTAINABLE 
ECONOMIC GROWTH
On 1 May 2004, eight former socialist countries (the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia) joined the EU; on 
1 January 2007, they were followed by Romania and Bulgaria. Three of them 
(Slovenia in 2007, Slovakia in 2009, and Estonia in 2011) joined the European 
4 In some CEE countries, for example, planning institutions had to be dismantled first, while in others they had 
been replaced by market institutions decades earlier; some countries had weak links with the world market, 
others had long ago developed trade relations and other forms of cooperation with Western countries.
5 Namely, assumed costs and benefits which enlargement would bring to incumbents differed very much from 
those of newcomers. For incumbents, potential benefits of enlargement would be scanty since they could reap 
the benefits of transition already under arrangements which prevailed in CEE after the dissolution of socialism.
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Monetary Union or euro area (EMU). Accession to the EU implied acceptance of 
the EU rules of the game (acquis communautaire followed by EU directives) and 
institutional convergence. Taking into account the relative size and the economic 
strength of newcomers, and flows of capital and ensuing changes in the ownership 
of productive assets in CEE countries one could say that enlargement of the EU 
with CEE countries was an acquisition rather than an accession. 
Acceptance of the EU rules of the game and institutional convergence should 
also lead to economic (GDP/capita, GDP growth, unemployment, inflation, internal 
and external stability represented by the budget and the current account balance) 
and social (shares of the public sector in GDP, equality etc.) convergence. However, 
it is hard to empirically distinguish between costs and benefits which could be 
attributed to transition, and costs and benefits which could be attributed to 
joining the EU. Relatively rapid GDP/capita convergence of CEE6 to the EU average 
began when transformational depression was overcome, i.e. far before their 
formal membership in the EU. Most of CEE countries reached the level of GDP 
before transition, i.e.in 1997, while they joined the EU in 2004 or 2007. One can 
nevertheless claim that the EU promised membership and preparations for the 
membership could also be commended for convergence. 
















Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), own calculations; The data indicate the position of a 
country compared to the EU27
6  In Graph 1, GDP/capita in 1996 and in 2008 of a country is compared to the corresponding GDP/capita in the 
EU27. For example, GDP/capita in Bulgaria in 1996 was at the level of 29 percent of the EU27 average, in 2008, 
it was at the level of 40 percent, Latvia jumped from 33 percent in 1996 to 54 percent in 2008, the jumps of the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia were smaller; from 76 to 83 and from 79 to 88. Note that the speed of convergen-
ce is upward biased for statistical reasons; a contribution of poorer countries to lowering the average.
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A kind of a »golden era« of growth lasted from 1993 to 2008. In this period, CEE 
fared well in comparison to the »old« EU members. Stimulated by the domestic 
demand and exports, the growth in CEE considerably outpaced the growth in 
the »old« EU countries which is in accordance with the theory of convergence. 
Inflation rates in CEE countries diminished gradually but persistently converging 
to a much lower inflation in the developed part of the EU. CEE countries were less 
successful considering employment and equilibrium. The average GDP growth in 
the »golden era« which stabilized at approximately 4 percent yearly was namely 
accompanied by the 12 percent unemployment rate and the 6 percent current 
account deficit. One could therefore talk of »jobless« and »unsustainable«7 growth. 
Average unemployment rates exceeded double digit figures in five countries 
with Poland leading while unemployment in Hungary and Slovenia remained 
well below the EU-15 average. »Jobless growth« which is manifested in high 
unemployment can be easily explained by structural changes in the labor market 
mechanism and evident shifts of the Okun’s curve (Mencinger, 2000). Relatively 
high double (current account and budget) deficits prevailed in most countries with 
the exception of Estonia (with a large current account deficit accompanied by a 
budget surplus), and Slovenia (with a small current account surplus and a not too 
large budget deficit). The development in this period led to the results at the end 
of the period presented in Table 1.  








































Czech R 10.3 13100 5.3 0.69 9610 -3.3 -36.6 -0.6 28.7 0.72
Estonia 1.34 10300 4.7 0.51 6310 -17.3 -75.0 2.5 3.4 -
Latvia 2.28 8200 6.0 0.30 3030 -22.9 -79.6 -0.3 9.7 1.15
Lithuania 3.38 7900 4.3 0.44 4770 -13.7 -49.9 -1.0 17.3 0.71
Hungary 10.1 9300 7.4 0.68 7340 -4.4 -109.9 -4.9 66.0 0.81
Poland 38.1 8100 9.6 0.32 3040 -3.7 -45.9 -1.9 45.2 0.59
Slovakia 5.40 11700 11.1 0.76 8950 -5.7 -49.7 -1.9 29.4 0.56
7 The sustainability of growth deals with the dependency of CEE on foreign savings, demonstrated in current 
account deficits and growing indebtedness. In a decade, the indebtedness (net foreign asset position) of CEE 
quadrupled.
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Slovenia 2.02 17300 4.9 0.59 11500 -4.9 -21.9 -0.1 24.1 1.09
Bulgaria 7.70 4000 6.9 0.40 1990 -21.5 -113.3 1.1 18.2 0.85
Romania 21.5 5800 6.4 0.24 1560 -14.1 -45.8 -2.5 13.0 0.53
EU15 330 27200 7.2 - - - - -0.7 66.3 -
EU27 501 23600 7.1 - - - - -0.9 59.0 -
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
At the end of the »golden era«, GDP/capita varied between €17.3 thousand 
in Slovenia and €4 thousand in Bulgaria, the unemployment rate between 4.7 
percent in Estonia and 11.1 percent in Slovakia. Slovakia was the most open 
country with exports amounting to 76 percent of GDP, while exports per capita 
were the highest in Slovenia. The current account deficit exceeded one fifth of 
GDP in two CEE countries and one tenth of GDP in three countries; the resulting 
negative net financial position (net foreign debt) exceeded GDP in Bulgaria and 
Hungary. Budget deficits as well aspublic debts were relatively small compared to 
the »old« EU states. 
As the new EU members lagged behind the EU average much more than the 
countries which had joined the EU during previous enlargements, the newcomers 
expected to be assisted in their catching-up process. However, hopes of large 
transfers from the EU budget to national budgets have proven to be illusions; 
the newcomers were from the very beginning in a much worse position than old 
cohesion countries (Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland). The »Big bang« enlargement 
in 2004 was namely based on political rather than economic considerations and the 
economic situation in the EU in 2004 was worse than the economic situation during 
previous enlargements. The new members were to contribute to the EU budget in 
well known forms (traditional own resources, a part of VAT revenues, a share of GNP, 
and a share for the UK rebate) and to introduce many costly »acquis«requested 
by the EU membership which increased their budget expenditures. Furthermore, 
while the flows from national budgets to the EU budget are certain, the flows in the 
opposite direction are conditional and uncertain; they in most cases request co-
financing and fulfillment of cumbersome administrative requests. The estimates of 
Nastavak tablice 1.
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net effects of accession on public finance therefore differ considerably, depending 
also on the place from where they come8.
Large current account deficits and the corresponding escalation of 
indebtedness became a steady feature of CEE. Their origin can be traced to the 
beginning of transition and stabilization policy which was based on Washington 
Consensus promoting abrubt liberalization of foreign trade. A predictable result 
of such abrupt liberalization of imports in the early nineties was a destruction of 
the manufacturing sector, large trade account deficits, and the sale of the best 
productive assets to foreign multinationals. Sales of state-owned companies 
to multinationals were also an important component of privatisation and 
restructuring; a significant part of FDI was cheap cash purchases of productive 
assets. FDI net inflows gradually calmed down as the »family silver« was more or 
less sold during hasty privatization, with Slovenia being an exception9. Though 
literature reveals mixed evidence on the spill-over effects of FDI for a host country10, 
positive spill-over effects of FDI have acquired the status of unquestionable 
truth, and FDI has remained a pillar of the development strategies in the CEE 
countries. Indeed, to attract FDI, the CEE countries have been willing to use various 
forms of subsidies: tax vacations, adaptation of the legal system or even direct 
financial assistance to multinationals11. By them, the CEE countries have replaced 
8 Thus, Dabrowski, Antzak and Gorzelak (2004) from Poland are very skeptical about net inflows to CEE and 
stress the costs involved by acceptance of the EU regulation and standards. Hallet and Keermean (2005) from 
EU directorates estimated that new countries could, due to the Copenhagen package-related appropriations 
for commitments, reckon on total budgetary envelope of €40.9 billions  in the 2004-2006 period. They however 
admitted that the amount actually paid will be much lower and will together with the running out pre-acce-
ssion assistance amount to €31.4 billion or 2 percent of GDP per year. Including €14.6 billion  contributions to 
the EU budget, which is 0.9 percent of their GDP, net inflows amount to €16.9 billion. This implies that in the 
2004-2006 period the new member countries would be as a group a net beneficiary receiving 1.1 percent of 
their GDP. This is far less than what was given to Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece in 2003, taking into acco-
unt their relative levels of development. In 2003, Spain received 1.2 percent, Greece 2.2 percent, Portugal 2.7 
percent and Ireland 1.4 percent of their GDP. These estimates do not include changes in the expenditure side 
of the budgets. Namely, most EU transfers are “additional” rather than substitutes of domestic expenditures.  
9 Indeed, Slovenian outward FDI (mainly to former Yugoslav republics) over-passed inward FDI. 
10  See Carkovic and Ross (2005), Lipsey (2006), Mencinger (2003).
11 Economic policy makers and development strategists in the EU new member states (CEE)  often consider FDI 
the pillar of their development, and indeed, CEE have been recipients of substantial net capital inflows. The 
policy makers overlook three issues: future outflows of capital and structural current account deficits which 
are more and more shaped by the income account, the resulting vulnerability to financial shocks, and social 
effects of domestic versus foreign ownership. The growing gap between the gross national product and the 
gross domestic product is an inevitable result of FDI. The outflow of capital in the form of dividends is spee-
ded up by the opportunities to relocate production to the countries with even cheaper labor. Most new FDI in 
the CEE are therefore investments in service and real estate sectors which weakens potential positive spillover 
effects of FDI. If outflow of capital exceeds FDI inflows, sudden interruption of FDI inflows could result in an 
exchange rate crisis. Furthermore, the difference in normal behavior of domestic and foreign owners should 
also be considered; the domestically-owned companies are more likely to support social and other activities 
in their country than foreign-owned companies. In theory, FDI is supposed to bring technology and know-
how, contribute to enterprise development and restructuring, increase international trade integration, bolster 
competition, and support human capital formation. The reality can differ. First, many FDI in CEE were cheap 
cash sales of assets. They were therefore not investments in the macroeconomic sense of the word, and the 
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contemptible sales of their assets in the period of speedy, ideologically and 
politically inspired privatisations during which the »family silver« in most of the 
CEE countries was sold. Within a decade, foreign ownership of productive assets 
became a major and in some sectors (financial services, telecommunications, retail 
trade) the predominant or even exclusive ownership. Though, average inflows of 
FDI in the 1996-2008 period exceeded average outflows of profits, the situation 
was rapidly changing; outflows were growing faster than inflows12. A structural 
current account deficit first caused by the trade deficit used to be more and more 
fueled by the income account deficit which in 2005 surpassed the total current 
account deficit of CEE; the growth based on foreign rather than domestic savings 
led to a huge negative net foreign financial position. 
Table 2 Balance of payments, 2001–2010 average % BDP
Current account Financial account
Investments
Total goods services incomes transfers direct portfolio Other
Bulgaria –10.74 –15.77 3.52 –1.65 3.17 12.38 –1.39 4.78
Czech Republic –3.64 –0.16 1.45 –5.17 0.25 4.57 0.34 0.67
Estonia –8.20 –12.59 8.34 –4.87 1.04 5.69 –2.73 4.83
Latvia –9.45 –17.11 4.83 –0.28 3.11 3.34 –0.33 8.46
proceeds from sales did not necessarily enhance productive assets of the countries. On the contrary, they were 
spent on consumption and imports. Second, a large portion of FDI in the CEE was concentrated in three acti-
vities: financial services, retail trade, and telecommunications. This implies that FDI does not contribute much 
to the horizontal or vertical transfer of technology and know-how of the host country, and also, that FDI might 
increase imports more than exports creating a trade deficit rather than a trade surplus. Third, there is no doubt 
that an acquisition of a local company by a multinational corporation increases efficiency of the company and 
that foreign multinationals are generally more productive than domestic firms. However, the resulting specia-
lization and purchases of raw materials within a multinational chain can nevertheless have a negative impact 
on the national economy if the links between the acquired company and the rest of the local companies are 
cut or reduced. In this case, the benefits of the enhanced efficiency accrue to a multinational corporation only 
rather than to the host country. In addition, the use of transfer prices etc. enables avoiding or lowering taxes 
on profits. Fourth, FDI can enhance competition but it is equally likely that FDI reduces competition. Indeed, 
a multinational can, particularly in a small country, establish a powerful monopoly which destroys and/or 
prevents creation of potential domestic competitors. Finally, multinationals often nominate foreign managers 
to head the acquired companies and they often transfer existing research activity of the companies abroad 
which hinders rather than spurs human capital creation in the host country.  The consequences of this transfer 
are clearly visible by the number of patents per million of population shown in Table 3, which, with the excep-
tion of Slovenia, lag enormously behind the EU average.
12 Within a decade, foreign ownership of productive assets became a major and in some sectors (financial servi-
ces, telecommunications, retail trade) the predominant or even exclusive ownership. Average yearly FDI inflow 
into CEE in the period 1996–2008 was approximately €20 billion, with the exception of 2003, when it halved. 
The FDI inflows therefore resulted in the growth of foreign-owned productive assets and correspondingly in 
enhanced investment income outflows. Though average inflows of FDI in the 1996-2008 period exceeded 
average outflows of investment income amounting to €16 billion yearly the situation was rapidly changing. 
Outflows of capital were namely growing from €2.5 billion in 1996 to €42 billion in 2008. The crisis changed 
the situation abruptly; while inflows of FDI to CEE dropped to €10 billion  yearly, outflow of profits continued to 
remain at the level of €40 billion  yearly.   
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Current account Financial account
Investments
Total goods services incomes transfers direct portfolio Other
Lithuania –6.32 –9.86 3.04 –2.15 2.65 2.77 0.95 2.73
Hungary –5.77 –1.59 1.51 –5.82 0.13 2.54 1.70 3.60
Poland –4.13 –3.04 0.52 –2.41 0.79 2.59 1.69 1.35
Romania –7.58 –9.10 0.00 –2.24 3.81 4.94 0.45 5.59
Slovenia –2.02 –3.45 2.97 –1.37 –0.18 0.64 0.13 2.78
Slovakia –6.39 –3.47 0.47 –3.31 –0.08 5.59 –0.30 3.12
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), own calculations
There was another price to be paid for the successful convergence of GDP/
capita. By entering the EU and the EMU (Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia) CEE have 
indeed ceased to exist as proper economic entities; they have given up most of the 
attributes which characterize a country as an economic entity (control of money, 
taxes, flows of goods, services, capital and labor over the borders, and its own 
economic system). Monetary policy (in three countries completely and in the other 
partially) was shifted to ECB, fiscal policy became more and more restricted by EU 
regulations, countries could not control flows of goods and capital, EU directives 
form the economic system. More important, flows of goods and capital are linked 
to the old EU member states and CEE countries became EU regions rather than 
states. This dependence is normal as they are small economies (except Poland) 
with export demand higher than 50% of GDP, which is very much concentrated on 
exports to the EU15. 
The dependence of CEE countries on the old EU countries is shown in Graph 
2 with quarterly rates of change of GDP and the three final demand components: 
household consumption, gross fixed investments, and exports of goods and 
services in the new and the old EU member states. The growth of GDP in CEE in the 
“golden era” was twice the growth in the old EU member states. The differences in 
the growth of household consumption were even larger particularly in the years 
preceding the crisis. 
Nastavak tablice 2.
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EU LONG-RUN STRATEGIES AND CEE COUNTRIES 
The Lisbon Strategy signed in March 2000 should have ensuredthe EU 
becoming the most efficient knowledge based economy by 2010. After some years 
of mantras on the strategy, the actual development brought admittance that the 
EU was not only far from the goals but also heading in the opposite direction. The 
European Commission reluctantly admitted that the strategy failed; in February 
2005, it was replaced by »Partnership for Growth and Jobs – New Beginning of the 
Lisbon Strategy«. In it, the ending year 2010 was abandoned, the number of goals 
was reduced, and responsibilities were turned to the governments of member 
states. The new strategy was said to be simple, pragmatic, and tangible13. It should 
be based on the partnership between the Commission and member states, 
which should create their own »Lisbons« and become responsible for efficiency, 
an increase of productivity, and employment which was to be attained by the 
assistance of »healthy« macroeconomic policy supporting structural reforms. 
There were no provisions for the turning point. Instead, the new strategy surprised 
13 Communication to the spring European Council (2005). Working together for growth and jobs, A new start 
for the Lisbon Strategy, COM (2005) 24.
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with an abundance of empty talks, newly invented phraseology and concepts, 
action plans and programs, priorities, mobilizations, new institutions and similar 
claptraps14. In short, if the economic growth in the EU had depended on rhetoric, 
it would have been high. Since it did not, the new strategy soon turned into a 
worthless political document. 
In CEE, which just entered the EU, the new strategy was met with similar 
enthusiasm by politicians but much less so by common people accustomed to 
many similar claptrap talks during the former regimes. One could nevertheless 
maintain that the two strategies contributed to the collapse of the manufacturing 
sector in CEE, already badly affected by the rapid liberalization of imports. CEE 
countries could namely easily compete with the old EU states if labor costs and 
productivity were the only determinants of the costs of production; average 
hourly labor costs (defined as the total labor costs divided by the corresponding 
number of hours worked) in CEE compared to average hourly labor costs in the 
EU-15, remained much lower than labor productivity in CEE compared to labor 
productivity in the EU-15.














European Union27 18,455 15,445 11,977 39.3 108.6
European Union15 21,350 17,948 13,945 39.8 135.1
Bulgaria 1.89 2,275 1,941 1,536 32.5 1.6 1350
Czech Republic 7.88 7,613 5,681 4,897 38.9 25.5 7730
Estonia 6.60 6,438 4,790 4,040 38.6 38.1 4840
Latvia 4.41 5,095 4,106 2,919 43.5 10.7 2440
Lithuania 5.09 4,439 3,383 2,798 38.8 6.5 3520
Hungary 7.13 5,858 4,559 3,457 43.6 20.2 5930
Poland 6.73 5,189 4,521 3,514 33.4 8.0 2560
Romania 3.40 3,567 2,786 2,068 43.1 1.7 1350
Slovenia 12.09 9,818 8,457 6,513 38.5 81.7 9230
Slovakia 6.41 5,883 4,662 4,035 34.5 6.0 7430
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), own calculations
14 See for example: EU (2005). Delivering on growth and jobs: A new and integrated economic and employ-
ment co-ordination cycle in the EU. Brussels: European Council.
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However, competing with much more ruthless societies, China, particularly, 
was simply impossible15. Some multinational corporations which had in the early 
nineties located production in CEE countries, began relocating a part of it to new 
poorer candidate countries and much more to poorer countries in Asia. This did 
not affect only production of many traditional industries with low value added jobs 
(textiles) but also industries with high value added jobs. By their relocation to the 
countries with miserable wages, nil social security, and disregard of externalities 
(which all contribute to high initial profits) these industries also swiftly turned to 
industries with low value added16 jobs. The relocation of production therefore 
also weakened the ability of CEE countries for creating more jobs in services. 
While it is true that by a higher economic growth and an increase in the standard 
of living in the rest of the world, new markets will emerge, their emergence will 
lag behind the disappearance of jobs in CEE due to the production being shifted 
from CEE. The number of patents per million of inhabitants clearly points out to 
one of the consequences of the destruction of the manufacturing sector during 
transition and selling its remnants to foreign multinationals:an absence of research 
and development. Indeed, by the number of patent applications per million of 
inhabitants, CEE countries belong to the third world countries.
In 2010, the EU launched Europe 2020: EU’s growth strategy for the decade. The 
collapses of the two previous strategies made European »planners«a little bit more 
cautious and the third strategy a little bit more realistic. For example, the former 
pillar of economic progress – globalization is now put among long-run problems 
together with the scarcity of natural resources and the aging of the population. 
The strategy should deliver growth which is to be: smart(based on more effective 
investments in education, research and innovation); sustainable (thanks to a 
move towards a low-carbon economy), and inclusive (with a strong emphasis on 
job creation and poverty reduction).The strategy is focused on five goals in the 
areas of employment (75% of the 20-64-year-olds to be employed), innovation 
(3% of the EU’s GDP to be invested in R&D),  education (reducing school drop-
out rates below 10% and at least 40% of 30-34–year-olds completing third level 
education), poverty reduction (at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of 
poverty and social exclusion), and climate change (lowering energy greenhouse 
gas emissions by 20%, increasing  energy production from renewable sources by 
20% and increasing energy efficiency by 20%). The goals are particularly ambitious 
15 Globalization occurred when the American model of capitalism prevailed not only over socialism but also over 
other models of capitalism which led to the globalization of market fundamentalism. 
16 Value added at market prices is a sum of wages, profits and net indirect taxes, i.e. taxes-subsidies. One can 
therefore increase profits if wages are miserable and net taxes low.
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for the CEE countries which lag behind the five strategic goals17considerably. What 
will happen to Europe 2020 remains uncertain. Though the strategy is slightly 
more realistic than the predecessors it nevertheless appears to be a kind of pre-
election program with a lot of promises, newly invented expressions, and empty 
slogans; the demand side is again ignored. Therefore, Europe 2020 might soon 
turn to a worthless political document providing speech-making and jobs for the 
EU bureaucracy responsible for its “implementation”. Recent developments do not 
even assure that the EU will exist in 2020.
SOCIAL COHESION AND IDEOLOGY
The transition has proven to be a painful process with many setbacks, and 
social and political tensions emerging from the redistribution of income, wealth, 
and power. This could have been expected; the transition began without a clear 
picture of the actual situation, without a fully worked-out scheme of a new 
economic system, and without a suitable economic and social arrangement 
in place. They were replaced by assumptions that the elimination of deformed 
non-market institutions, restoration of private ownership together with a laissez-
faire free market mechanism would instantly transform socialist countries 
into welfare states. New, mostly inexperienced governments were assisted by 
international financial institutions; many domestic politicians and foreign advisers 
were ideologically and politically motivated - their major goal being abolition 
of socialism and existing institutions rather than a gradual creation of a viable 
economic system and an increased economic prosperity for everybody. In short, 
previous prevention of »capitalist exploitation ideology« was replaced by what 
George Soros called »market fundamentalism«.
Unwarranted expectations did not materialize; many people suffered substan-
tial reductions in their standards of living, production declined, unemployment 
increased, and distribution of income worsened (Ellman, 2000). The enthusiasm 
of Western countries over political freedoms and economic transition in Eastern 
Europe diminished as well when they realized that the amount of money needed 
17 The first goal of Europe 2020 (75 percent employment rate) indicates an important shift in philosophy or awa-
reness that the basic problem of contemporary world is a lack of jobs and that economic, social, and political 
developments in the near future will be determined by employment and unemployment and their social con-
sequences. Unemployment is far the most severe social problem also in CEE countries; out of the three kinds of 
economic growth: »smart, sustainable and inclusive«, CEE will therefore have to care for the inclusive growth: 
creation of new jobs. Most jobs in the decade before the crisis were lost in manufacturing, partly because of 
“smart” growth or technological change, and partly because of moving production to »China«; a part of ma-
nufacturing and employment in it can only be brought back by actually holding back imports to the EU while 
repeating a free trade rhetoric. The ability to request »fair« trade and competition which would request that 
competitors  comply with minimal social norms and rights of workers has been missed by greed of multinati-
onals and the EU thoughtlessness.  
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to cope with a nostalgia for communism’s cradle-to-grave social benefits would 
exceed available financial resources.





































in GDP %  old age  %health
EU27 47.6 4.83 106.6 64.1 9,7 29.4 45.0 37.4
EU15 48.1 4.89 65.4 9,7
Bulgaria 38.3 5.84 92.3 59.7 11,3 18.1 51.5 32.2
Czech R. 43.8 3.48 102.2 65.0 6,7 20.1 47.2 40.1
Estonia 36.7 5.03 85.5 61.0 12,5 18.1 44.2 37.7
Latvia 38.0 6.97 83.9 59.3 16,2 17.8 53.4 28.4
Lithuania 36.2 7.25 87.6 57.8 15,4 19.1 44.0 35.8
Hungary 49.9 3.42 96.3 56.4 10,9 23.1 45.4 33.7
Poland 43.8 4.96 100.0 59.3 9,7 18.9 60.9 31.6
Romania 36.7 6.05 86.6 58.8 7,4 17.6 50.7 34.7
Slovenia 46.6 3.40 102.5 66.2 8,2 24.8 46.3 39.6
Slovakia 39.1 3.80 102.3 58.8 13,6 18.6 43.0 39.5
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
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Social cohesion can be measured by indicators of equality or inequality 
(the inequality coefficient, the Gini coefficient, the risk of poverty rate) and their 
determinants such asthe share of the public sector in GDP, the employment rate, the 
unemployment rate, public expenditures for health, education and social security 
etc. According to indicators presented in Table 4, CEE countries can be put into 
two groups; four countries (Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia) 
have retained reasonable social cohesion; their inequality coefficients being lower 
than the EU average. Three Baltic countries are the extreme on the other side. Their 
poor social state is to some extent reflected in large emigration18. Population of 
CEE countries which amounts to one fifth of the EU population, has since 1991 
decreased from 106 million to 102 million; the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia 
and Slovakia have retained population unaltered, while population in other CEE 
countries has decreased; in three Baltic states by 15 percent, in Bulgaria by 13, in 
Romania by 8, and in Hungary by 4 percent. The employment rate in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia is above the EU average, other countries lag behind in this 
(most likely decisive)pillar of social cohesion. By the share of public expenditure in 
GDP, CEE countries lag behind the EU average (except Hungary), they are however 
divided into two groups in this aspect as well; the Baltic countries, Romania, and 
Slovakia with less than forty percent of public expenditure in GDP, and other CEE 
countries with more than forty percent. CEE countries lag considerably behind 
the EU average in social protection expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Indeed, 
social protection expenditures in developed old member states exceed 30 percent 
in France, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland and Sweden, while it is less 
than 20 percent in seven CEE countries, with the exception of Slovenia, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic. The share of old age benefits in the total social protection 
expenditures was the highest in Poland, and the lowest in Slovakia, while the share 
of health was the highest in Slovakia and the lowest in Latvia. 
The employment rate might be considered the major indicator of economic 
performance; it also determines social cohesion of the country. The relationship 
between it and the Gini coefficient is depicted by a scatter diagram in Graph 4 with 
the employment rate on the horizontal axis and the Gini coefficient on the vertical. 
Average values create four quadrants called Scandinavian, Anglo-Saxon, Central 
European, and Mediterranean. Six (Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Poland) out of ten CEE countries fall in the Mediterranean quadrant with less than 
an average economic and social performance (less than the average employment 
rate and higher than the average Gini coefficient) together with Greece, Spain, Italy 
and France. Slovenia and the Czech Republic are in the “Scandinavian” quadrant, 
Slovakia and Hungary in the “Central European” quadrant.
18  Besides political reasons related to Russian  population.  
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Before transition, Western Europe was admired in all former socialist countries 
for its political democracy and social market model. However, when former socialist 
countries joined the EU, many features of the attractive European social market 
model were no longer there. Furthermore, the EU showed very little interest to 
promote the model in transition countries. The emptiness created by the fall 
of socialism was therefore filled up by American advisers promoting the pure 
»shareholders value« type capitalism. They were immediately followed by many 
domestic preachers and politicians; very often former »Marxists« who quickly 
turned to »Hayekians«, while the governments (»left« and »right«) accepted 
neoliberal beliefs in market institutions much more than the governments in 
the old EU countries. Indeed, CEE countries are quite high on different scales of 
economic liberty calculated by the Heritage Foundation or the Fraser Institute, and 
slightly worse on the scales of competitiveness calculated by WEB. Estonia, which is 
clearly leading on the scales of the first two institutions, is considered more liberal 
than most EU countries; it is followed by Latvia, Lithuania and the Czech Republic 
which are close to the EU-15 average. Slovenia is on the bottom not only among 
the ten newcomers but also among the 27 EU members. The situation is very much 
reversed on the Economic Complexity Index or the Human Development Index 
where the Czech Republic and Slovenia are leading, and Baltic countries lagging. 
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Czech R. 70.4 (28/3) 7.13 (46/6) 4.57 (36/2) 1.63 (8/1) 0.865 (27/2)
Estonia 75.2 (14/1) 7.52 (15/2) 4.61 (33/1) 0.79(32/7) 0.835 (34/3)
Latvia 65.8 (56/6) 6.92 (60/9)  4.14 (70/9) 0.59(39/9) 0.805 (43/8)
Lithuania 71.3 (24/2) 7.40 (24/4) 4.38 (47/5) 0.68(36/8) 0.810 (40/7)
Hungary 66.6 (51/5) 7.52 (15/3) 4.33 (52/6) 1.43(14/3) 0.816 (38/5)
Poland 64.1 (68/10) 7.00 (54/8) 4.51 (39/3) 1.02(25/5) 0.813 (39/6)
Slovakia 69.5 (37/4) 7.56 (13/1)  4.25 (60/7) 1.38(15/4) 0.834 (35/4)
Slovenia 64.6 (66/9) 6.78 (74/10) 4.42 (45/4) 1.52(10/2) 0.884 (21/1)
Bulgaria 64.9 (60/7) 7.34 (28/5) 4.13 (71/10) 0.59(40/10) 0.771 (55/10)
Romania 64.7 (63/8) 7.08 (48/7) 4.16 (67/8) 0.94(27/6) 0.781 (50/9)
* values of the Heritage Foundation index are between 89.7 (Hongkong) and 22.1 (Zimbabve); values of 
the Fraser freedom index are between 9.01 (Hongkong) and 4.06 (Zimbabve);  values of  the WEF index are 
between 5.63 (Switzerland) and 2.73 (Chad); values of  the ECI (economic complexity index) are between 
2.313 for Japan and  -1.907 for Mauretania; values of the HDI (human development index) are between 
0.943 (Norway) and  0.343 (Central African Republic);  The first number in parenthesis shows the position 
of a country among all countries evaluated, while the second number shows the position among the ten 
CEE countries.
Source: home pages of relevant institutions
CRISIS IN CEE COUNTRIES
Financial crisis rapidly infected Europe. It was brought about by European 
banks, central banks included, as they had purchased new financial products with 
AAA+ ratings from US banks. The reason was similar to that in the United States, an 
unlimited belief in the market mechanism combined with greed. Namely, Europe 
was increasingly replacing its own economic order – »social market capitalism« 
with the American version of »shareholder value capitalism« and increasingly 
accepted the lessons of neoliberalism, although not without frequently adding 
completely pointless bureaucratic rules. The financial sector expanded far beyond 
rational limitsin the EU as well, and the profits from generating virtual wealth were 
also mind boggling in European banks and other financial institutions. 
At the outbreak of the crisis, EU institutions were confused; their initial response 
was to wish the crisis away by repeating mantras from documents such as the 
Lisbon Strategy or the Stability Pact. Following initial confusion, the EU continued 
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to prevent the collapse of the financial system; government guarantees for deposits 
prevented the flight of money from deposit accounts into cash, pumping large 
quantities of primary money into the banking system prevented the collapse of 
even more banks. This has not yet strengthened mutual trust between banks and 
has not encouraged them to put more loans into circulation. The so-called credit 
crunch persisted, though one should not overlook that the crunch followed the 
previous credit addiction. 






























Czech Republic 81.3 0.69 83 25 0.77 -3.3 -36.6
Estonia 70.6 0.51 99 29 1.62 -17.3 -75.0
Latvia 58.0 0.30 63 26 2.90 -22.9 -79.6
Lithuania 61.0 0.44 92 29 1.53 -13.7 -49.9
Hungary 63.5 0.68 83 20 1.32 -4.4 -109.9
Poland 53.8 0.32 70 23 1.15 -3.7 -45.9
Slovakia 68.6 0.76 97 19 0.86 -5.7 -49.7
Slovenia 90.9 0.59 36 15 1.60 -4.9 -21.9
Bulgaria 38.1 0.40 80 24 1.29 -21.5 -113.3
Romania 40.6 0.24 88 26 1.27 -14.1 -45.8
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), ECB
The global financial crisis, particularly the credit reduction hit CEE countries 
with large external financing needs exceptionally hard. Foreign banks, very much 
involved in banking in CEE and until 2008 enjoying rates of returns on equity 
which were twice the rates of returns on equity in their home countries19, began 
to withdraw their capital from CEE countries by shrinking balance sheets in the 
subsidiaries. At the same time FDI dropped to one fourth of the pre-crisis level. 
CEE countries thus faced net outflow rather than inflow of capital. Indeed, as seen 
in Graph 5 the net outflow of capital (the difference between inflow of FDI and 
outflow of profits from CEE countries) in the crisis years tripled. 
19 In 2007, the average share of profits of five major players (Erste Group, Unicredit, Raiffeisen, KBC, Intensa San-
paolo) in CEE amounted to 30.5% of profits while the asset share was 22.5%. At the end of 2007, 42 % of the 
total assets of the Austrian banking sector were in CEE countries.   
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Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu), own calculations
While the EU was attempting to deal with the financial crisis, it turned into 
a recession or even a depression. The drop of the economic activity affected CEE 
countries linked to the rest of the EU even harder than the development in the 
financial sector. Namely, their manufacturing sector does not depend only on the 
general economic situation in the old EU but much more on production of durable 
consumer goods for which they produce spare parts. 
In the crisis, CEE countries faced two issues: how to secure external financing 
during the crisis and how to deal with the downturn in the real sector. While GDP 
in the EU27 dropped from growth of +2.9 percent to –4 percent, shrinkage of GDP 
in small Baltic countries reached or exceeded 15 percent and in other more than 5 
percent, the only exemption being a relatively large Polish economy which because 
of its size depends on the economic activity in the EU less. The link between the 
drop of GDP and exports is confirmed by similar drops of exports. The crisis was 
accompanied by an expansion of unemployment and an increase of the budget 
deficit and a corresponding increase of the public debt. However, increases of 
budget deficits are similar to the increases of deficits in the rest of the EU, while 
public debts in CEE countries are lower than in the most EU member countries, 
which is due to »youth« of the countries20. 
20 The notions of budget deficit and public debt were practically unknown in the so-called centrally planned 
»shortage« economies or in Yugoslavia where the gap between budget revenue and expenditure was covered 
by the central bank.
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Table 6 The effects of the crisis on performance of CEE







2007 2009 2008 2009 2007 2010 2007 2009 2007 2010
EU27 2.9 -4.0 7.1 9.8 -0.8 -6.8 58.7 80.1
Czech R. 6.8 -4.7 9610 7730 5.3 6.7 -0.6 -5.8 28.7 37.6
Estonia 7.5 -14.3 6310 4840 4.7 11.3 2.5 -1.8 3.4 6.7
Latvia 9.6 -17.7 3030 2440 6.0 15.1 -0.3 -9.6 9.7 44.7
Lithuania 9.8 -14.8 4770 3520 4.3 16.2 -1.0 -9.5 17.3 30.0
Hungary 0.1 -6.8 7340 5930 7.4 9.8 -4.9 -4.5 66.0 81.3
Poland 6.8 1.6 3040 2560 9.6 9.9 -1.9 -7.3 45.2 54.9
Slovakia 10.5 -4.9 8950 7430 11.1 13.6 -1.9 -8.0 29.4 41.0
Slovenia 6.9 -8.0 11500 9230 4.9 7.9 -0.1 -6.0 24.1 38.8
Bulgaria 6.4 -5.5 1990 1530 6.9 12.1 1.1 -4.7 18.2 16.3
Romania 6.3 -6.6 1560 1350 6.4 7.3 -2.5 -8.5 13.0 31.0
Source: Eurostat (http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu)
What can we say after twenty years of transition in CEE countries? Was it a 
success or was it a failure? Was a high speed of transition bound to the so-called 
Washington consensus a major error as suggested by Joseph Stiglitz (1999)? Can 
economic and social problems in CEE countries, created by the crisis, be linked to 
socialist heritage as often suggested by younger economists in CEE countries?  The 
answers to the questions depend on the goal. If the major goal was the destruction 
of the old political regime and of socialism, the transition can be considered a 
success, if, however, the goal of the transition was the creation of general economic 
and social prosperity, the transition cannot be so clearly regarded a success story. 
The problems in CEE countries have been to a great extent overshadowed by 
the problems of the EU periphery (Greece, Spain, Portugal) which represent a much 
more dangerous threat for the future of the EU than the problems in CEE countries. 
This can be to some extent explained by CEE countries being accustomed to the 
hardships and their reliance on »welfare family« economy. Furthermore, the CEE 
countries have not performed so badly; Poland is the only EU country which has 
not faced depression, GDP in Slovakia recovered quickly and surpassed its level 
before the crisis, while GDP in other countries in 2011 remained approximately 
5 percent lower than it had been before the crisis. Some major social difficulties 
(unemployment, income disparities, etc.) worsened. It is premature to assert that 
the crisis will create opportunity for a break with the present, and the search for a 
new capitalism, or a return to the European social market economy. Institutional 
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changes in CEE  depend on the future of the EU which is not promising. The EU 
economy cannot be kick-started by increasing the competitiveness on the global 
market, but by the increased demand which could only be generated by the 
governments. Unfortunately, this appears to be impossible having in mind hysteric 
affection for savings and reduction of the public sector. The recession in the EU 
might therefore persist; the extension of the crisis is but much more dangerous to 
the future of the EU than the depth of the crisis21. A lengthy recession could namely 
lead to a “Yugoslav” syndrome: i.e. to endless discussions of who is to be blamed, 
who is exploiting whom, and who should be rescued and who should not. It is not 
very likely that CEE countries would be winners in such a development.
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OD PADA SOCIJALIZMA DO KRIZE KAPITALIZMA: ISKUSTVA ZEMALJA 
SREDNJE I ISTOČNE EUROPE
SAžETAK
„Povratak kapitalizmu” i „Povratak Europi” slogani su koji su obilježili posljednje desetljeće 20. stoljeća u svim bivšim 
socijalističkim zemljama srednje i istočne Europe; oni si izražavali bezuvjetnu vjeru u mehanizme kapitalističkog tržišta 
i punopravno članstvo u Europskoj uniji, što se smatralo rješenjem svih sadašnjih i budućih  ekonomskih i socio-političkih 
problema. 
Tijekom tzv. zlatnog doba, zemlje srednje i istočne Europe značajno su nadmašile rast u „starim“ zemljama Europske 
unije te se brzo uskladile s prosječnom razinom razvoja EU-a. Međutim, rast nije bio temeljen na zapošljavanju i nije bio održiv; 
u velikoj mjeri temeljio se na stranoj štednji. Veliki deficiti na tekućim računima stoga su postali trajna značajka zemalja srednje 
i istočne Europe. Izvor deficita može se pronaći u nagloj liberalizaciji strane trgovine tijekom tranzicije dok se nastavak trenda 
deficita povezuje s inozemnim izravnim ulaganjima. Zemlje srednje i istočne Europe postupno su postale potpuno ovisne o 
»staroj« Europi. Lisabonska strategija pridonijela je propasti proizvodnog sektora; iako su se zemlje srednje i istočne Europe 
mogle lako nositi sa »starom Europom« nisu se mogle natjecati s nemilosrdnom društvima izvan Europe. 
U društvenom smislu, zemlje srednje i istočne Europe mogu se podijeliti u dvije skupine; one koje su zadržale razumnu 
društvenu koheziju, te tri baltičke zemlje koje su otišle u drugu krajnost. I dok izdatak za socijalnu skrb u starim zemljama 
članicama prelazi 30% BDP-a, isti izdatak u sedam od 10 zemalja srednje i istočne Europe iznosi manje od 20% BDP-a. Prije 
tranzicije, u bivšim socijalističkim državama divili su se Europskoj uniji zbog njene demokracije i modela socijalnog tržišnog 
gospodarstva. U trenutku kada su se pridružile Europskoj uniji, mnoge značajke privlačnog europskog modela socijalnog 
tržišnog gospodarstva više nisu bile prisutne i EU nije pokazivala interes da taj model promovira u tranzicijskim zemljama. 
Praznina je popunjena neoliberalnim idejama, što se vidi po indikatorima ekonomske slobode. 
Globalna financijska kriza, osobito smanjenje kreditiranja, značajno je pogodila zemlje srednje i istočne Europe s 
velim potrebama vanjskog financiranja. Strane banke počele su povlačiti svoj kapital  smanjenjem bilanci u podružnicama. 
Istovremeno, inozemna izravna financiranja pala su na četvrtinu u odnosu na razdoblje prije krize. Zemlje srednje i istočne 
Europe na taj način suočile su se s neto odljevom umjesto s nužno potrebnim priljevom kapitala.
Ključne riječi: zemlje srednje i istočne Europe, tranzicija, ekonomski rast, socijalna kohezija, ekonomska kriza.
